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entry results for: 1) Lonergan & “natural law” = 273; 2) Lonergan & “natural right” = 64; 3) Lonergan & “ley natural” = 6; 4) Lonergan & “derecho natural”.
 
Brennan, Patrick. (2005-6) Asking the Right Questions: Harnessing the Insights of Bernard Lonergan for the Rule of Law. Journal of Religion and Law 21/1. pp. 1-38. “[P]rior to the criteria of truth invented by philosophers,” observes Bernard Lonergan, “there is the dynamic criterion of the further questions immanent in intelligence itself.” That criterion I shall refer to as inner law…The law of any community, I shall argue, is what is generated by and only by human operators faithful to the foundational operator that is inner law. For that desire, rather than something external to us, is our “natural law.” Failure to acknowledge the dynamic, inner source of the rule of law leads to dead ends…’ (Other publications).
  
Brennan, Patrick. (2002) Realizing the rule of law in the human subject. Boston College Law Review. Vol. 43, No 2. pp. 227-350.
  
Cherry, Mark (Editor, 2004) Natural Law And The Possibility Of A Global Ethics. Springer. 200 pp. Accounts of natural law moral philosophy and theology sought principles and precepts for morality, law, and other forms of social authority, whose prescriptive force was not dependent for validity on human decision, social influence, past tradition, or cultural convention, but through natural reason itself. This volume critically explores and assesses our contemporary culture wars in terms of: the possibility of natural law moral philosophy and theology to provide a unique, content-full, canonical morality; the character and nature of moral pluralism; the limits of justifiable national and international policy seeking to produce and preserve human happiness, social justice, and the common good; the ways in which morality, moral epistemology, and social political reform must be set within the broader context of an appropriately philosophically and theologically anchored anthropology. This work will be of interest to philosophers, theologians, bioethicists, ethicists and political scientists.
 
Crysdale, Cynthia (1995) Revisioning natural law: from the classicist paradigm to emergent probability  Theological Studies; 9/1. In a nutshell, how would describe your attempt at reworking natural law ethics based upon emergent probability?
  
Doran, Robert (2003) Implementation in Systematics: The Structure Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis 3 164-272. See p. 267. Obviously, for any student of Lonergan, there is: namely, the basic and total science, the Grund-und Gesamtwissenschaft, that can be found in the cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics of Insight, the existential ethics of both Insight and Method in Theology, and the unfolding of these into the theory of history that, for Lonergan, probably reaches its most nuanced articulation in Natural Right and Historical Mindedness.
   
Doran, Robert (2006) Why Lonergan? Launch of theLonergan Instituteat Seaton Hall.  In one of his most important papers, Natural Right and Historical Mindedness, Bernard Lonergan focused on the issue of collective responsibility. He makes the rather startling statement at the beginning of the paper that “collective responsibility is not yet an established fact.” But, he suggests, “it may be a possibility. Further, it may be a possibility that we can realize. Finally, it may be a possibility that it is desirable to realize… We can begin by networking the various Lonergan Centers and projects around the world (coordination of collaborative projects, electronic linking of both written documents and recorded lectures, conferences, and workshops). I would identify three major ongoing projects along the lines of developing and implementing Lonergan’s work:1)  the collaborative construction of a contemporary Catholic systematic theology, 2) the development of Lonergan’s macroeconomic theory, and 3) the work of interreligious understanding and dialogue.
Dunne, Tad.
Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  
Fejfar, Antony, Jurisprudence for a New Age. The book utilizes Metaphysics, Quantum Physics, classical philsophy, and the Critical Realist philosophy of Jesuit philospher Bernard Lonergan to set forth a whole new paradigm for Jurisprudence, that is, practical wisdom related to law.
  
Forte, David (Editor, 1998). Natural Law and Contemporary Public Policy
  
Georgetown
University Press. 398 pages. Rooted in Western classical and medieval philosophies, the natural law movement of the last few decades seeks to rediscover fundamental moral truths. In this book, prominent thinkers demonstrate how natural law can be used to resolve a wide range of complex social, political, and constitutional issues by addressing controversial subjects that include the family, taxation, war, racial discrimination, medical technology, and sexuality.This volume will be of value to those working in philosophy, political science, and legal theory, as well as to policy analysts, legislators, and judges.
  
Graham, Mark Edward (2000) Josef Fuchs on natural law. Boston College Dissertations and Theses. See p.p. 54-55. This study develops and critiques the natural law theory of Josef Fuchs, S.J., who for the past forty odd years has been one of the most influential figures in the attempt to construct a natural law theory serviceable for use in Roman Catholic moral theology. In over 400 articles and books, Fuchs has returned time and again to fundamental matters in natural law theory and has provided valuable insights that have clarified, refined, and contributed positively to the ongoing attempt to rehabilitate Roman Catholic natural law theory. This study is divided into two parts, corresponding to two distinct periods in Fuchs's thought on natural law. The first part treats Fuchs's natural law theory from 1941-66, which shared many of the preoccupations and presuppositions of the neo-Thomist manualists who dominated Roman Catholic moral theology during this time: a confident metaphysics of nature as the foundation of natural law; a quest for universal moral norms; a skeptical moral epistemology in which only the magisterium was capable of grasping concrete moral truths; negligible attention to circumstantial data in the determination of moral rightness; and a notion of the moral agent principally as an applicator of received teaching in concrete situations. While serving on the Pontifical Commission on Population, Family, and Birth, 1963-66, Fuchs underwent a profound intellectual conversion that altered his understanding of natural law markedly and prompted him to repudiate most of his earlier positions. The second part of this study examines his thought from 1966 to the present and critically assesses the adequacy of various foundational components of his mature natural law theory, including his theological anthropology and his notions of moral epistemology, moral competency, the role of the individual moral agent, and the function of reason and experience in discovering natural law. Although Fuchs's mature natural law theory exhibits certain weaknesses that need further attention, his insights have provided the substantive beginnings of a credible and persuasive conception of natural law that can be fruitfully developed by subsequent commentators. 
  
Guy Mansini, (2007) Lonergan on the Natural Desire in the Light of Feingold, Nova et Vetera, 5, no. 1 pp. 185-198. Feingold’s book structures the debate over nature and grace in terms of three questions: whether the natural desire to see God is (1) innate or elicited, (2) conditional or unconditional, and (3) demonstrative of the possibility of seeing God or not. Lonergan, unlike Feingold, answers the first question with the answer “innate,” specifically an innate tendency of intellect. Knowing this tendency requires revelation of man’s supernatural end. Moreover, although the desire’s fulfillment is conditional, the desire itself is not–precisely because it is natural, “structural,” and “always on.” In the end, Lonergan, unlike Aquinas, breaks up the connections between natural inclination, natural passive potency, and the debt of its fulfillment. For Lonergan, the desire is natural, in an obediential potency, and not owed. Yet Lonergan’s position is also ambiguous: in some texts he characterizes it in a way that would make it elicited; in others he regards it as nothing other than the natural desire to understand the transcendentals, not God specifically. Lonergan, does however, reject the importance of the possibility of a state of pure nature. Yet it is hardly marginal: abandoning its possibility endangers the distinction between creature and creator, i.e., the divine transcendence.
  
Haughey, John (2002) Responsibility for human rights: contributions from Bernard Lonergan. Theological Studies, Vol. 63. 
  
Hanson, Rob (2003) Objective Decision Making in Lonergan and Dworkin. Boston College Law School. Vol44, No3. pp. 825-862.
  
Kevin O’Reilly, The Vision of Virtue and Knowledge of the Natural Law in Thomas Aquinas. Nova et Vetera, 5, no. 1 (2007): 41-66. Affectivity is integral to the perception of the human good, according to Aquinas. This means that despite the universality of natural law, ability to perceive it is particular. The life of virtue is itself the process of the discovery of the right rules guiding human conduct since knowledge even of self-evident truths comes via reflection on experience. Since, for Aquinas, the rationality of natural law is that of practical reason, whose condition is appetitive, the correctness of practical intellect means conformity in contingent matters to right appetite. Yet appetite influences man’s ability to judge; it has a “certain power of resistance” to reason. Habits (good or evil) confirm the apparent goodness of what accords with them. This leads to the concrete situation adduced by Aquinas: that the Germanic tribes, because of their habits of raiding, failed to consider theft wrong, although it is contrary to the natural law. Virtue theory and natural law theory are thus inseparable and mutually imply one another.
 
Kalscheur, Gregory (1996). Law School as a Culture of Conversation: Re-imagining Legal Education as a Process of Conversion to the Demands of Authentic Conversation. Boston College – Law School. Loyola University Chicago Law Journal Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal, Vol. 28, pp. 333-371.
 
Ledesma, José e Jesús. Educación Integral para Juristas. Ver la hermenéutica analógica en la educación integral.
  
Lonergan original (1977). Natural Right and Historical Mindedness in Proceedings: American Catholic Philosophical Association 15, pp. 132-43. Reprinted in A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan. Crowe, Fred ed. New York: Paulist Press and London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985, pp. 169-83. 
  
Lonergan Studies Newsletter 13 (1992) Tracking stray ideas in Lonergan: the Toynbee connection. See p. 84-5.  Toynbee lists some of the critiques his book received, he remarks, “With Reconsiderations available, the critics are far less impressive” (A Third Collection 109 n. 8, in the 1975 lecture, “Healing and Creating in History”). Still, he had already begun to refine his own position, and by 1972 had found the categories in which to locate Toynbee’s contribution in relation to scientific history: A Study of History “might be regarded as a source-book of ideal-types” (Method 228). This viewpoint seemed to remain, for we find it three times in A Third Collection: “Toynbee thought he was contributing to empirical science. Since then, however, he has recanted. But, I believe, his work remains a contribution not to knowledge of reality, but to the ideal types that are intelligible sets of concepts and often prove useful to have at hand when it comes to describing reality or to forming hypothesis about it” (p. 10, in the 1974 article, “Dialectic of Authority”); again, the work “can be viewed, not as an exercise in empirical method, but as the prolegomena to such an exercise, as a formulation of ideal types that would stand to broad historical investigations as mathematics stands to physics” (p. 178, in the 1977 lecture, “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness”); and it is a work “which I have found less a narrative of events than a repertory of ideal types” (p. 214, in the 1980 paper, “A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion”).  
Los Angeles Lonergan Center. 
Notes: Bias and Decline, the Social Surd, False Facts, & Cosmopolis. Lonergan suggests the need for a higher viewpoint which recognizes and implements the principle that intelligence contains its own immanent norms and that these norms are equipped with sanctions which man does not have to invent or impose. This higher viewpoint is built around a grasp of what traditionally has been called natural right or natural law. Because it involves a grasp of natural right, it can appeal to a normative foundation from which criticism can be carried out (all criticism presupposes a normative criterion). The carrier of criticism he names culture. In general, culture (art, religion, philosophy, journalism) must be freed from the need to justify itself to the practical mind. Recall that the general bias of common sense can make an uncritical culture its captive (Machiavellianism, Hobbesian rationality, social engineering). What is the higher viewpoint Lonergan has in mind? Cosmopolis.
Mansini, Guy (2007) Lonergan on the Natural Desire in the Light of Feingold, Nova et Vetera, 5, no. 1 185-198. Feingold’s book structures the debate over nature and grace in terms of three questions: whether the natural desire to see God is (1) innate or elicited, (2) conditional or unconditional, and (3) demonstrative of the possibility of seeing God or not. Lonergan, unlike Feingold, answers the first question with the answer “innate,” specifically an innate tendency of intellect. Knowing this tendency requires revelation of man’s supernatural end. Moreover, although the desire’s fulfillment is conditional, the desire itself is not–precisely because it is natural, “structural,” and “always on.” In the end, Lonergan, unlike Aquinas, breaks up the connections between natural inclination, natural passive potency, and the debt of its fulfillment. For Lonergan, the desire is natural, in an obediential potency, and not owed. Yet Lonergan’s position is also ambiguous: in some texts he characterizes it in a way that would make it elicited; in others he regards it as nothing other than the natural desire to understand the transcendentals, not God specifically. Lonergan, does however, reject the importance of the possibility of a state of pure nature. Yet it is hardly marginal: abandoning its possibility endangers the distinction between creature and creator, i.e., the divine transcendence.
  
McConnell, Michael; Carmella, Angela; Cochran, Robert. (2001) Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought Review by Patrick McKinley Brennan. Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 16, No. 2. pp. 667-673.
  
McPartland,  Thomas (2001) Lonergan and the Philosophy of Historical Existence. University of Missouri Press. 305 pp. See p 116. Bernard Lonergan’s ambitious study of human knowledge, based on his theory of consciousness, is among the major achievements of twentieth-century philosophy. He challenges the principles of contemporary intellectual culture by finding norms and standards not in external perceptions or reified concepts, but in the dynamism of consciousness itself. Lonergan and the Philosophy of Historical Existence explores the implications of Lonergan’s approach to the philosophy of history in a number of distinct but related contexts, covering a variety of intellectual disciplines. McPartland argues that Lonergan’s unique perspective on scientific method, epistemology, metaphysics, and critical theory can illuminate what seem to be the quite alien topics of reason as religious experience, the anxiety of existence, the existential roots of bias, and mythopoesis and mystery. Here there is a remarkable parallel to the philosophy of history of Eric Voegelin. The concluding chapters of the book show how the equivalence of the two philosophies offers a mutually enriching dialogue between Lonergan’s critical realism and Voegelin’s existential exegesis.
  
Melchin, Kenneth. Exploring the Idea of Private Property: A Small Step Along the Road from Common Sense to Theory. Journal of Macrodynamic Análisis 3 (2003): 287-301.
  
Morelli, Mark & Elizabeth (Editors 1997) The Lonergan Reader. University of Toronto Press. 400 pp. See pp. 589-1. 1) From an Introduction. In ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,’ an article written near the end of his life, the character of Lonergan’s project as an effort to complete the transposition from classical to modern controls of meaning is illustrated with stark clarity. Lonergan also describes in it the ideal of enlightenment appropriate to this epochal moment in our history: ‘As always enlightenment is a matter of the ancient precept, Know thyself. But in the contemporary context, it aims to be such self-awareness, such self-understanding, such self-knowledge, as to grasp the similarities and the differences of common sense, science, and history, to grasp the foundations of these three in interiority which also founds natural right and, beyond all knowledge of knowledge, to give also knowledge of affectivity in its threefold manifestation of love in the family, loyalty in the community, and faith in God.’
  
Muhigirwa Rusembuka Ferdinand SJ. (2006) The Two Ways of Human Development According to Bernard Lonergan. Anticipation In Insight. Woodstock Theological Center.
  
O’Reilly, Kevin (2007) “The Vision of Virtue and Knowledge of the Natural Law in Thomas Aquinas,” Nova et Vetera, 5, no. 1 41-66.  Affectivity is integral to the perception of the human good, according to Aquinas. This means that despite the universality of natural law, ability to perceive it is particular. The life of virtue is itself the process of the discovery of the right rules guiding human conduct since knowledge even of self-evident truths comes via reflection on experience. Since, for Aquinas, the rationality of natural law is that of practical reason, whose condition is appetitive, the correctness of practical intellect means conformity in contingent matters to right appetite. Yet appetite influences man’s ability to judge; it has a “certain power of resistance” to reason. Habits (good or evil) confirm the apparent goodness of what accords with them. This leads to the concrete situation adduced by Aquinas: that the Germanic tribes, because of their habits of raiding, failed to consider theft wrong, although it is contrary to the natural law. Virtue theory and natural law theory are thus inseparable and mutually imply one another.
  
Pérez Valera, Victor. (2002)  Deontología jurídica: Ética del ser y quehacer del abogado.
  
Picard, Cheryl (2003) So What Is All This Talk About “Insight Mediation? “Mediation and Insight: Contributions to the Field of Conflict Resolution from the Work of Lonergan,” in Fred Lawrence (ed.) Lonergan Workshop (19).
  
Powell, Russell (2004) Toward Reconciliation in the Middle East: A Framework for Christian-Muslim Dialogue Using Natural Law Tradition. Seattle University School of Law. Loyola University Chicago International Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1. In this paper, I argue that the thinking of Bernard Lonergan in light of the natural law insights of St. Thomas Aquinas, Ali Ezzati and Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im provides a framework for Christian-Muslim dialogue. Lonergan’s transcendental method moves from the individual subject to universal insights rather than presuming to deduce universals a priori, without regard for history, culture and individual experience. I assert that the most fruitful starting place for meaningful dialogue is to address questions of human rights and social justice using natural law theory, rather than focusing on theological concerns. If Muslims and Christians mutually acknowledge and defend basic human dignity as a consequence of commonly held natural law conclusions, reconciliation and the formation of solidarity become more likely.
My proposal to use natural law as a framework for Christian-Muslim dialogue is made within the Thomistic tradition; however, I accept some postmodern intuitions. Thus, my theoretical approach tends to be more like that of Bernard Lonergan or Steven D. Smith than that of John Finnis. My concern for rights and procedure make me sympathetic to the work of Ronald Dworkin and Lon Fuller, respectively, particularly with regard to praxis.
  
Tetlow, Joanne What Is Right by Nature? Part II, chap. 4. Seminar: Voegelin’s Anamnesis. 09/09/2006.